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COMMENTS
THE PRESS, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND
CIVIL DISCOURSE: HOW A FEDERAL
SHIELD LAW COULD REAFFIRM
MEDIA CREDIBILITY IN AN
ERA OF “FAKE NEWS”
By: Jenna Johnson*
ABSTRACT
The Constitution expressly provides protection for the freedom of the press.
Yet there is one area in which the press is not so free: the freedom to refuse
disclosing confidential sources when subpoenaed by the federal government.
Currently, there is no federal reporter’s privilege. The Supreme Court has held
the First Amendment provides no such protection, and repeated congressional
attempts to codify a reporter’s privilege in a federal shield law have failed.
Arguments against a shield law include national security concerns and the
struggle to precisely define “journalist.” Such concerns were evident in the
most recently proposed shield law, the Free Flow of Information Act of 2017.
This Comment advocates in favor of passing a federal shield law. Specifically,
this Comment analyzes the Free Flow of Information Act of 2017 against the
backdrop of a post-9/11 America where “fake news” runs rampant. Though
far from perfect, the proposed law was a step toward balancing national secur-
ity concerns with press freedom. Legislators can and should strike an effective
balance between these two tensions by accurately defining terms like “national
security” and “properly classified” to prevent government overreach. Finally,
this Comment argues that a federal shield law is necessary to combat the re-
cent national security concerns raised by “fake news” and thereby reaffirm
media credibility.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND REPORTER PRIVILEGE . . . 423
A. The First Amendment Freedom of the Press . . . . . . . . 423
B. Development of Reporter’s Privilege and Shield
Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
C. Branzburg: A Supreme Court Blow to a Federal
Reporter’s Privilege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
* J.D. Candidate, Texas A&M School of Law, May 2020. I would like to thank
my advisor, Professor Lisa Rich, for her advice, edits, and encouragement throughout
the writing of this Comment (and beyond). I would also like to thank my mother,
Julie Gillett, and my husband, Garrett Ross, for their gracious sacrifice and patience
during law school. In addition, thank you to my friends in the media industry and to
my mentors who sparked my passion about this topic, including: Professor Edward
Julbe, Professor Boriana Treadwell, and Dr. Samuel Terilli.
419
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V7.I2.4
420 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
2. Branzburg Majority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
3. Justice Powell’s Concurrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429
4. Branzburg Dissent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429
D. Branzburg Aftermath and Federal Shield Law
Attempts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
III. EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN PRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
A. From Pamphlets to Tweets: The Changing Nature of
News Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
B. The Era of Fake News and Civil “Discord” . . . . . . . . . 433
IV. WAR AND PRESS: NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS . . . . . 436
A. Modern Historical Tension Between National
Security and Press Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436
B. National Security and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
V. ANALYSIS OF THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION ACT
OF 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
A. Defining “Journalist” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
B. A Qualified Privilege: National Security
Exceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443
VI. EFFECT OF A FEDERAL SHIELD LAW: MEDIA AND
NATIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446
A. Persisting Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447
B. Unintended Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448
C. Reaffirming Media Credibility in the “Fake News”
Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
VII. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451
I. INTRODUCTION
“I admit that I do not feel toward the freedom of the press that complete
and instantaneous love which one accords to things by their nature su-
premely good. I love it more for considering the evils it prevents than
on account of the good it does.” –Alexis De Tocqueville1
In an era of media distrust and “fake news,” yet another proposal
for a federal shield law languished and died in Congress.2 If it had
passed, the Free Flow of Information Act of 2017 would have pro-
vided reporters a qualified privilege to refuse to reveal confidential
sources if subpoenaed by the government.3 Forty-nine states and the
District of Columbia currently provide some form of a reporter privi-
lege either by statute or judicial decision.4 Yet Congress has repeat-
1. Michael Schudson, Why Democracies Need the Unlovable Press, in FREEING
THE PRESSES: THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN ACTION 73, 73 (Timothy E. Cook ed., 2005).
2. Free Flow of Information Act of 2017, H.R. 4382, 115th Cong. (2017).
3. Id.
4. ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE 98 (2007).
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edly failed to codify a federal privilege, and federal courts have issued
conflicting rulings about its existence and scope.5
Given the lack of a federal reporter privilege or “shield law,” jour-
nalists must assert a First Amendment privilege to conceal their
sources from compelled disclosure.6 This assertion is premised on the
assumption that forced disclosure of sources and information creates a
“chilling effect” on the flow of news.7 The threat of disclosure may
prevent sources from speaking to journalists, thus impeding the infor-
mation reaching the public.8
The debate surrounding a federal shield law is not new, but the sub-
stantial number of federal subpoenas issued to reporters since the turn
of the century has reinvigorated the debate.9 The most notable exam-
ple is the 2005 incarceration of New York Times reporter Judith
Miller, who spent eighty-five days in jail after refusing to reveal her
source in a federal grand jury investigation of a CIA leak.10 Again, in
2011, the government attempted to subpoena New York Times re-
porter James Risen.11 Risen was subpoenaed to name the CIA agent
who acted as a key source for his book: State of War: The Secret His-
tory of the CIA and the Bush Administration.12 The shield law debate
was revived again in 2018 when federal authorities seized the emails
5. Shielding Sources: Safeguarding the Public’s Right to Know: Hearing on H.R.
4283 Before the Joint Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Affairs & Subcomm. on
Healthcare, Benefits, & Admin. Rules of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform,
115th Cong. 12–14 (2018) [hereinafter Lee Levine Subcommittee Hearing Statement]
(statement of Lee Levine, Senior Counsel, Ballad Spahr, LLP).
6. See LEWIS, supra note 4, at 88.
7. Generally, an activity causes a “chilling effect” when it deters some type of
First Amendment activity. Donna M. Murasky, The Journalist’s Privilege: Branzburg
and Its Aftermath, 52 TEX. L. REV. 829, 851–52 (1974). For example, the activity may
deter sources from coming forward with information or deter journalists from pursu-
ing or reporting information. Id. at 852. For further discussion on the “chilling effects”
caused by compelled disclosure, see id.; see also Laurence B. Alexander & Ellen M.
Bush, Shield Laws on Trial: State Court Interpretation of the Journalist’s Statutory
Privilege, 23 J. LEGIS. 215, 228 (2015).
8. Geoffrey R. Stone, Why We Need a Federal Reporter’s Privilege, 34 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 39, 41–42 (2005).
9. Lee Levine Subcommittee Hearing Statement, supra note 5, at 9.
10. Judith Miller Freed From Jail After Agreeing to Testify, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Sept. 30, 2005), https://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-re-
sources/news/judith-miller-freed-jail-after-agreeing-testify [https://perma.cc/QDE5-
VHZR]; see generally In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1144
(D.C. Cir. 2005).
11. See Sarah Ellison, What Was New York Times Reporter James Risen’s Seven-
Year Legal Battle Really For?, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 17, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://www
.vanityfair.com/news/2015/03/james-risen-anonymous-source-government-battle
[https://perma.cc/V2DT-WJFA].
12. After the Supreme Court declined to hear Rosen’s appeal, the Attorney Gen-
eral modified the subpoena to ask only certain facts about the book, not identification
of sources. See id.
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and phone records of a former Senate Intelligence staffer who worked
with The New York Times.13
These examples of jailing reporters and issuing federal subpoenas
also form part of the post-9/11 narrative of media treatment.14 In the
immediate aftermath of 9/11, the press unearthed several governmen-
tal abridgements of civil liberties that were classified as national secur-
ity secrets.15 The government responded by “prob[ing] the weaknesses
of free press doctrine” for restrictions on publishing such informa-
tion.16 As such, subpoenas reflect the difficulty in balancing the gov-
ernment interest in preserving national security secrets with the
press’s interest in disseminating matters of public concern.17
Balancing these interests is further complicated by the “fake news”
phenomenon that exploded during the 2016 presidential election, in
which fabricated news stories circulated through social media.18 In a
Pew Research poll studying the effect of fake news, 64% of Ameri-
cans thought fake news caused confusion as to basic current events.19
Besides public confusion surrounding deceptive stories, the term
“fake news” has also evolved into a political weapon wielded by the
executive to express disdain for the press.20 For example, in August
2018, President Trump took to Twitter to criticize the “fake news me-
dia,” tweeting:
There is nothing that I would want more for our Country than true
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. The fact is that the Press is FREE to
write and say anything it wants, but much of what it says is FAKE
NEWS, pushing a political agenda or just plain trying to hurt peo-
ple. HONESTY WINS!21 / THE FAKE NEWS MEDIA IS THE
13. Carolyn McAttee Certin & Kevin Johnson, Former Senate Staffer Indicted;
Feds Seize ‘N.Y. Times’ Reporter’s Phone, Email Records in Leak Probe, USA TO-
DAY (June 7, 2018, 10:23 PM ET), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/
06/07/feds-seize-new-york-times-reporters-phone-email-records-leak-probe/6835480
02/ [https://perma.cc/Y63S-CNDE].
14. Keith Werhan, Rethinking Freedom of the Press After 9/11, 82 TUL. L. REV.
1561, 1592 (2008).
15. Id. at 1567–68.
16. Id. at 1568.
17. See id. at 1567–69.
18. Mike Wendling, The (Almost) Complete History of “Fake News”, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-42724320 [https://perma.cc/
U7Y2-QSHW].
19. Michael Barthel, Amy Mitchell, & Jesse Holcomb, Many Americans Believe
Fake News is Sowing Confusion, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.journal-
ism.org/2016/12/15/many-americans-believe-fake-news-is-sowing-confusion/ [https://
perma.cc/L3AA-2ZJP].
20. Rebecca Morin, Trump Labels Media the ‘Opposition Party’ as Newspapers
Push Back En Masse, POLITICO (Aug. 16, 2018, 9:52 AM EDT), https://www.politico
.com/story/2018/08/16/trump-calls-media-fake-news-as-newspapers-push-back-
against-claim-779555 [https://perma.cc/7QLU-A77Z].
21. President Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 16, 2018, 7:10
AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1030094399362007040?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/5G9U-5SAG].
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OPPOSITION PARTY. It is very bad for our Great Country.
. . .BUT WE ARE WINNING!22
Political rhetoric aside, fake news also presents national security
concerns. Disinformation campaigns created to “destabiliz[e] states
through the subversion of societ[y]”—such as those alleged to have
been carried out by Russia and China—add a problematic layer to the
issue.23 It is not entirely clear whether public distrust in the media is a
symptom of fake news, a contributing factor, or perhaps a combina-
tion of both.24 Regardless, the fake news phenomenon has under-
scored the public’s diminishing trust in the media as an institution and
called into question the role of the press in American society.25
This Comment advocates for a federal shield law in a post-9/11 and
fake news-ridden America. Specifically, it will explore balancing the
government’s interest in national security with adoption of a shield
law and argue that a shield law will help reaffirm trust in the media.
Part II provides relevant background on the First Amendment and
press privileges, the development of shield laws, and failed attempts at
passing a federal shield law. Part III discusses how the changing na-
ture of the news industry and fake news contribute to media skepti-
cism and raise national security concerns. Part IV explores the
historical pattern of curtailing First Amendment freedoms during war
and the resulting press–government relationship. Part V analyzes the
most recently proposed shield law to examine national security and
media implications. Finally, Part VI assesses problems left unan-
swered by proposed federal shield laws and ultimately argues that a
shield law can reaffirm media credibility.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND REPORTER PRIVILEGE
A. The First Amendment Freedom of the Press
The Framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights unquestionably
considered the freedom of the press a pillar of democratic society and
central to representative self-government.26 Every proposal to the Bill
22. President Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 16, 2018, 5:50
AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1030074380397752320?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/G2AH-XT6R].
23. NORMAN VASU, BENJAMIN ANG, TERRI-ANNE, TEO, SHASHI JAYAKUMAR,
MUHAMMAD FAIZAL, & JUHI AHUJA, FAKE NEWS: NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE
POST-TRUTH ERA 5, 9–13 (2018), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/
PR180313_Fake-News_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TGU-PD2B].
24. Mark Verstraete & Derek E. Bambauer, Ecosystem of Distrust, 16 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 129, 139 (2017).
25. Philip M. Napoli, What if More Speech is No Longer the Solution? First
Amendment Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMM. L.J. 55,
57 (2018).
26. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 50
(1991).
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of Rights contained a press clause.27 One such proposal, authored by
James Madison, read, “and the freedom of the press, as one of the
great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”28 This proposed lan-
guage evolved into the First Amendment Press Clause we know to-
day: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.”29 It is clear from the plain language of the
Amendment that the Framers intended for Congress to be “com-
pletely without power to pass laws that would abridge . . . freedom of
the press.”30 Furthermore, the primary force behind the First Amend-
ment was to “guard[ ] against breaches of trust by public officials.”31
The prevailing thought was that protecting free expression would pro-
vide an essential checking function on the government.32
Though the First Amendment carved out the right of press freedom,
it did not address the scope of that freedom.33 And since the First
Amendment’s passage, it is precisely the scope of this freedom that
the press and the courts have attempted to define.34 The Supreme
Court diligently upheld press rights in the forms of freedom from gov-
ernment prior restraints35 and from penalties for published content.36
However, the Court has been far more circumspect regarding press
access to information and a claimed reporter’s privilege.37
B. Development of Reporter’s Privilege and Shield Laws
Generally, a reporter’s privilege is “the legal right to maintain confi-
dentiality” of sources and information without fear of punishment.38
This privilege protects journalists from having to reveal their sources
as part of compulsory proceedings and “facing the contempt citation
that might otherwise result” from refusal.39
27. Id. at 47.
28. Id. at 45.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30. POWE, JR., supra note 26, at 47.
31. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. BAR
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527 (1977); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington
(Sept. 9, 1792) (“No government ought to be without censors: and where the press is
free, no one ever will.”).
32. Blasi, supra note 31, at 527.
33. POWE, JR., supra note 26, at 48; see also Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural
Address (Mar. 4, 1805) (“[T]he Press, confined to truth needs no other legal restraint;
the public judgment will correct false reasonings and opinions, on a full hearing of all
parties; and no other definite line can be drawn between the inestimable liberty of the
press, and its demoralising licentiousness.”).
34. See POWE, JR., supra note 26, at 48.
35. See LEWIS, supra note 4, at 96 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)).
36. See id. (citing N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
37. Id. Section II.C of this Comment is devoted to discussion of the Court’s rejec-
tion of a constitutional federal reporter’s privilege in its landmark decision,
Branzburg v. Hayes. See infra Section II.C.
38. POWE, JR., supra note 26, at 179.
39. RonNell Andersen Jones, Rethinking Reporter’s Privilege, 111 MICH. L. REV.
1221, 1223–24 (2013).
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Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have adopted some
form of a reporter’s privilege either by a judicial decision or by stat-
utes known as “shield laws.”40 State shield laws vary widely in their
scope of protection,41 but most fall into one of two categories: abso-
lute privilege or qualified privilege.42 Absolute privilege affords jour-
nalists broad protection to safeguard their sources. Fourteen states
and the District of Columbia provide some form of absolute privilege
or near absolute privilege.43 Oregon, for example, has adopted an ab-
solute privilege by statute, which provides that a reporter is not com-
pelled to reveal sources or information unless there is probable cause
to believe the journalist himself has committed or is about to commit
a crime.44
A qualified privilege, by contrast, sets forth conditions under which
newsgatherers may keep certain sources and information confiden-
tial.45 For example, North Carolina grants journalists a “qualified priv-
ilege against disclosure in any legal proceeding of any confidential or
nonconfidential information, document, or item obtained or prepared
while acting as a journalist.”46 To overcome this privilege and compel
disclosure, the party requesting the information must meet a three-
part test demonstrating that the information (1) is “relevant and mate-
rial” to the legal proceeding; (2) “cannot be obtained from alternate
sources;” and (3) is “essential to the maintenance of a claim or de-
fense.”47 Moreover, North Carolina denies this privilege for any infor-
mation obtained as a result of the reporter witnessing or observing
“criminal or tortious conduct” firsthand.48
State shield laws vary in amount of protection, but all recognize the
societal value in an autonomous press free from “forced court testi-
mony.”49 Many states passed shield laws as a result of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Branzburg v. Hayes.50 The Branzburg decision re-
mains a leading example of the institutional press “challeng[ing] vari-
ous manifestations of governmental and social orthodoxy” during the
Civil Rights and Vietnam War era.51
40. LEWIS, supra note 4, at 98.
41. Lee Levine Subcommittee Hearing Statement, supra note 5, at 15.
42. See Stone, supra note 8, at 49.
43. Bill Kensworthy, State Shield Statutes and Leading Cases, FREEDOM FORUM
INST., https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-
of-the-press/state-shield-statutes-leading-cases/ (last updated Apr. 2011) [https://per
ma.cc/J9GB-GB48].
44. OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520 (2017).
45. See Alexander & Bush, supra note 7, at 218.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11(b) (2017).
47. Id. § 8-53.11(c).
48. Id. § 8-53.11(d).
49. AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY AND
PAPARAZZI THREATEN A FREE PRESS 151 (2015).
50. See infra Section II.D; Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689 n.27 (1972).
51. Blasi, supra note 31, at 525.
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C. Branzburg: A Supreme Court Blow to a Federal Reporter’s
Privilege in the Grand Jury Context
1. Background
In its landmark decision, Branzburg v. Hayes, the Supreme Court
expressly rejected the argument that the First Amendment grants a
federal reporter’s privilege in the context of a grand jury subpoena.52
Notably, however, the Court did not find that newsgathering lacked
First Amendment protection altogether.53
The Branzburg decision consolidated three cases54 involving jour-
nalists who refused to reveal confidential sources when subpoenaed to
testify in court. In the first case, Kentucky reporter Paul Branzburg
wrote two articles for a daily paper in Louisville: one detailing his ob-
servations of two young men synthesizing hashish from marijuana,
and one as a “comprehensive survey of the ‘drug scene’ in Frankfort,
[Kentucky] . . . .”55 Branzburg was subpoenaed separately for each
article, and both times he refused to identify his sources on the
grounds that he was entitled to a First Amendment reporter’s privi-
lege.56 Because Branzburg had promised his sources confidentiality,
he argued that naming them would destroy his relationships with
those sources and greatly damage his reputation as a reporter.57 The
Kentucky Court of Appeals denied his applications seeking writs of
mandamus and rejected Branzburg’s claim of a First Amendment re-
porter’s privilege.58
The second case, In re Pappas, involved a reporter–photographer
assigned to report on civil disturbances in New Bedford, Connecticut,
including an anticipated police raid of the Black Panthers’ headquar-
ters.59 The Black Panthers allowed Pappas to enter its headquarters in
exchange for his agreement not to disclose anything except the antici-
52. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 665.
53. Id. at 681 (“Nor is it suggested that newsgathering does not qualify for First
Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom
of the press could be eviscerated.”).
54. Some scholars have noted the peculiarity in the fact that the Supreme Court
lumped all three cases together and “treated them as indistinguishable, even though
Branzburg had clearly witnessed the commission of a crime, whereas Caldwell and
Pappas had not.” POWE, JR., supra note 26, at 180.
55. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667–69.
56. Id. at 668–69.
57. Id. at 669–70.
58. Id. at 670. Specifically, the Kentucky Court of Appeals “tacitly” rejected
Branzburg’s claim pursuant to the Kentucky Constitution, and found that Kentucky’s
statutory reporter privilege did not permit Branzburg to refuse to testify about his
personal observations. Id. at 669. The court also explicitly rejected Branzburg’s claim
to a First Amendment privilege, citing the “generally recognized rule that the sources
of information of a newspaper reporter are not privileged under the First Amend-
ment.” Id. at 670 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
59. Id. at 672.
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pated police raid.60 The police raid never occurred, so Pappas never
published the article.61 When later summoned by a grand jury, Pappas
asserted a First Amendment “privilege to protect confidential infor-
mants and their information” and refused to answer questions about
events that occurred within the headquarters.62 The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts rejected a First Amendment privilege, instead
preferring the public’s “right to every man’s evidence” over counter-
vailing interests.63
In the third case, United States v. Caldwell, New York Times re-
porter Earl Caldwell was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury
relating to his coverage of the Black Panther Party.64 Caldwell moved
to quash the subpoenas.65 He argued that his testimony would “driv[e]
a wedge of distrust and silence between the news media and the mili-
tants.”66 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the First
Amendment “provided a qualified testimonial privilege to newsmen”
to refuse to testify, absent compelling reasons from the government
requiring such testimony.67 The Supreme Court granted certiorari for
all three cases.68
2. Branzburg Majority
The majority opinion, authored by Justice White, rejected the idea
that compelled testimony would exert an unconstitutional burden on
newsgathering.69 The Court did not eliminate the potential for re-
porter privilege altogether, however. Framing the issue narrowly, the
majority considered “the obligation of reporters to respond to grand
jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions relevant
to an investigation into the commission of crime.”70
In examining the fairness of forced testimony, the Court recognized
several circumstances in which “valid laws serving substantial public
interests” could be enforced against the press.71 Specifically, the Court
noted that the press was “regularly excluded” from grand jury pro-
ceedings, judicial conferences, meetings of official bodies, private or-
ganization meetings, crime scenes when the general public is excluded,
and certain trials if press restrictions were necessary to assure the de-
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 672–73.
63. Id. at 674 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
64. Id. at 675–76.
65. Id. at 676 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
66. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
67. Id. at 679.
68. Id. at 667, 671, 675, 679.
69. Id. at 682.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 682–83.
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fendant a fair trial.72 The Court also acknowledged that although
some states at that time had recognized a reporter’s privilege, many
had declined to do so, and federal legislation had been introduced but
never enacted.73 In a pragmatic assessment, the Court realized the po-
tential for criminals to abuse a reporter’s privilege.74 Criminal confi-
dential informants’ “preference for anonymity” was “presumably a
product of their desire to escape criminal prosecution.”75 The Court
found this motive undeserving of constitutional protection.76
The Court emphasized the constitutionally mandated role a grand
jury played in effective law enforcement.77 It found no basis that this
government interest was “insufficient to override the consequential,
but uncertain, burden on news gathering . . . .”78 The petitioner re-
porters and multiple amici submitted briefs asserting that forced testi-
mony would radically change the news industry by creating a chilling
effect on the flow of information.79 The Court expressed substantial
doubt about the premise, noting it “remain[ed] unclear how often and
to what extent inform[ants] [were] actually deterred from furnishing
information” when reporters were forced to testify.80 According to the
Court, the “symbiotic” relationship between the press and confiden-
tial informants was unlikely to be harmed by threat of a subpoena.81
The Court also observed that the press had “flourished” without “con-
stitutional protection for press informants.”82 In addition, the Court
highlighted that the qualified privilege claimed by petitioners would
not solve the purported “chilling effect,” because confidential infor-
mants would still run the risk of exposure whenever a judge deemed
the disclosure justified.83
Finally, the Court noted that even if it were to accept the reporters’
“chilling effect” argument, the public interest in possible future news
did not outweigh the public interest in prosecuting criminal activity.84
Ultimately, the Supreme Court declined to interpret the First Amend-
ment as granting journalists “a testimonial privilege that other citizens
72. Id. at 684–85.
73. Id. at 689–90. For example, the Court noted that seventeen states had a form
of privilege and federal legislation had been introduced in 1959, 1963, 1970, and 1971
with no action. Id. at 689 nn.27–28.
74. See id. at 691.
75. Id.
76. Id. (“The preference for anonymity of those confidential informants involved
in actual criminal conduct is presumably a product of their desire to escape criminal
prosecution, and this preference, while understandable, is hardly deserving of consti-
tutional protection.”).
77. Id. at 690.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 693.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 694.
82. Id. at 698–99.
83. Id. at 702.
84. Id. at 695.
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[did] not enjoy.”85 As far as grand jury proceedings were concerned,
“the public’s right to evidence of [a] crime trumped First Amendment
newsgathering freedoms.”86
3. Justice Powell’s Concurrence
Numerous state and federal courts interpreted Justice Powell’s con-
currence as a modification of the majority opinion—resulting in wide-
spread confusion.87 In his concurrence, Justice Powell emphasized the
“limited nature” of the majority decision.88 He specifically noted that
members of the press were not “without constitutional rights” with
respect to newsgathering and safeguarding sources.89 He indicated
that members of the press could prevail if they believed that a grand
jury investigation was not being conducted in “good faith” or bore
only a “tenuous relationship” to the reporter’s work.90 Finally, Justice
Powell advocated that the “asserted claim to privilege should be
judged on its facts” and courts should balance societal interests with
constitutional interests on a case-by-case basis.91
Some courts have interpreted the “case-by-case” method advocated
in the concurrence as authorizing a federal reporter’s privilege in cer-
tain circumstances.92 Differing interpretations have resulted in an in-
consistent patchwork of federal circuit jurisprudence on the topic of
reporter’s privilege.93
4. Branzburg Dissent
Justice Stewart authored a strongly-worded dissent in Branzburg, in
which Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall joined.94 According to
85. Id. at 690.
86. GAJDA, supra note 49, at 201.
87. LEWIS, supra note 4, at 88.
88. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 710.
91. Id.
92. GAJDA, supra note 49, at 201. For example, in United States v. Sterling, the
Fourth Circuit found no First Amendment privilege existed in the criminal context
but recognized a privilege for civil cases. United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482,
496–97 (4th Cir. 2013). That civil privilege could only be overcome by meeting a
three-part test. Id. By contrast, the First Circuit recognizes a duty to “balance the
potential harm to the free flow of information,” and advocates for the “constitution-
ally sensitized balancing process stressed by Mr. Justice Powell.” Bruno & Stillman,
Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 596, 596 n.13 (1st Cir. 1980). The Second
Circuit provides journalists a qualified privilege modeled on Justice Powell’s three-
part test. United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 42 (2d Cir. 2011). Reporter’s privilege
in the Third Circuit is assessed on a “case-by-case basis.” Coughlin v. Westinghouse
Broad. & Cable Inc., 780 F.2d 340, 350, 350 n.14 (3d Cir. 1985) (Becker, J., concur-
ring). The other circuits are similarly in conflict. See Lee Levine Subcommittee Hear-
ing Statement, supra note 5, at 13–14.
93. GAJDA, supra note 49, at 201; see also LEWIS, supra note 4, at 88.
94. Blasi, supra note 31, at 595.
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Justice Stewart, the majority opinion would allow state and federal
authorities to “undermine the historic independence of the press by
attempting to annex the journalistic profession as an investigation arm
of government.”95 Justice Stewart recounted the indispensable value
of a free press to self-government, noting that the Court had expressly
held that the “right to publish is central to the First Amendment and
basic to the existence of constitutional democracy.”96 He also noted
judicial recognition of the right to gather news as a corollary of the
right to publish, which implied a right of confidentiality between re-
porters and sources.97 In particular, he stated that the press relied on
confidential sources in order to “fulfill its constitutional mission.”98
Further, “unbridled subpoena power” would either deter sources from
providing information, or effectively act as a prior restraint by deter-
ring reporters from gathering and publishing information.99
Instead of focusing on the potential for abuse by criminals, Justice
Stewart lamented that government informants would “be fearful of
revealing corruption or other governmental wrongdoing” due to the
threat of identification through compulsory processes.100 He also
noted the dilemma of a reporter choosing between his journalistic eth-
ics and contempt of the court.101 To balance the competing interests of
the government and press, Justice Stewart suggested that a press privi-
lege should protect reporters from compelled testimony until the gov-
ernment had advanced a “clear showing of a compelling overriding
national interest that [could not] be served by any alternative
means.”102
D. Branzburg Aftermath and Federal Shield Law Attempts
In the aftermath of Branzburg, ten more states quickly passed
shield laws.103 State-by-state enactment of statutory shield laws con-
tinued, increasing from seventeen states at the time of the Branzburg
decision104 to thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia at pre-
sent.105 However, a shield law on the federal level floundered.
95. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 726–27 (internal citations omitted).
97. Id. at 728.
98. Id. at 728–29.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 731.
101. Id. at 732.
102. Id. at 747.
103. Nathan Siegel, Our History of Media Protection, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/02/AR2005100201237
.html [https://perma.cc/8K8Q-XZM7].
104. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 689 n.27 (noting seventeen states had passed a shield
law).
105. Out of the forty-nine states that provide a reporter’s privilege, thirty-nine of
them provide it through statutory enactment rather than through judicial decision. See
Kensworthy, supra note 43.
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In September 1972, six federal shield law bills were introduced in
Congress, and sixty-five were introduced the following year.106 At
least six more bills were introduced between 1974 and 1987.107 None
of them passed. More modernly, a federal shield law has been intro-
duced in Congress nearly every session since 2005, each with varying
degrees of progression in the enactment process.108 The Free Flow of
Information Act of 2007 in particular garnered significant media at-
tention with House passage109 before ultimately dying in the Senate.
Various obstacles have prevented the passage of a federal shield
law. One of the main impediments, as noted in Branzburg, is the prac-
tical difficulty in assessing whom a federal shield law would cover.110
Indeed, Congress has struggled to articulate an acceptable definition
of “journalist,” attributable to the changing nature of the news indus-
try that includes citizen journalists and bloggers.111 Congress under-
standably does not wish to protect those “who publish without
hesitation, reflection, or a sense of ethics.”112 However, some scholars
stress that the definitional quandary may be more daunting in theory
than it is in practice.113 In the majority of free press cases, the claimant
fits squarely “within anyone’s definition of ‘the press.’”114 Nonethe-
less, the debate over who constitutes a “journalist” poses difficult
questions given the diversified state of the modern media.
III. EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN PRESS
A. From Pamphlets to Tweets: The Changing Nature
of News Media
Despite the clear importance of press freedom to the Framers,
many media scholars note that the Framers’ understanding of the
“press” likely differed substantially from the institutionalized “press”
106. A Short History of Attempts to Pass a Federal Shield Law, REPS. COMMITTEE
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/
news-media-law/news-media-and-law-fall-2004/short-history-attempts-pass-f (last vis-
ited Sept. 22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7TJH-U65V].
107. See id.
108. See, e.g., H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. (2007) (died in the Senate); H.R. 985, 111th
Cong. (2009); H.R. 2932, 112th Cong. (2011) (introduced but never passed); H.R.
1962, 113th Cong. (2013).
109. Elizabeth Williamson, House Passes Bill to Protect Confidentiality of Report-
ers’ Sources, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2007/10/16/AR2007101601298.html [https://perma.cc/BD3S-4GCA].
110. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972) (“Sooner or later, it would be
necessary to define those categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege, a
questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is
the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as
much as of the large metropolitan paper who utilizes the latest photocomposition
methods.”).
111. GAJDA, supra note 49, at 152.
112. Id.
113. Werhan, supra note 14, at 1601.
114. Id. at 1600–01.
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we know today.115 The colonial era press was organized to engage in
the business of printing products from newspapers to almanacs but
not in the “practice of journalism” associated with the modern
press.116 During the Bill of Rights drafting, the institutionalized
“press” was “organized through business and political linkages” rather
than as a profession in and of itself.117 Although free from direct gov-
ernment control, the press was driven by political factions to print
opinion politics.118 Thus, some historians argue the “freedom of the
press,” as the Framers understood it, perhaps “referred to the free-
dom of people to publish their views” via the printing “press” rather
than the “freedom of journalists to pursue their craft.”119
The dawn of the Industrial Revolution and the invention of the
“penny press” in the mid-1800s facilitated mass-circulation—which
made the news business more profitable.120 The late nineteenth cen-
tury saw the rise of “Yellow Journalism,” a period of sensationalist
news containing propaganda and occasionally even “outright factual
errors.”121 Some scholars note the parallels between early newspaper
rivalries using salacious stories to attract readers and the fake news or
“click-bait” headlines of today.122
Eventually, the press began to shift its focus from partisan politics
toward objectivity.123 Professionalism grew during the Progressive Era
of the 1920s with the rise of professional journalism associations and
codes of journalistic ethics.124 The advent of radio and television ac-
centuated the transition to the concept of “undifferentiated mass com-
munication.”125 In the 1960s and 1970s, the press fully demonstrated
its capability as a “government watchdog.” Journalists were praised
for reporting on government scandals like Watergate and revealing
the real costs of the Vietnam War.126
From roughly the 1920s until the Internet era, the concept of an
institutionalized media with fairly discernable definitions for the
115. Craig M. Freeman, Introduction, in Freeing the Presses: The First Amendment
in Action, supra note 1, at 29, 29.
116. Charles E. Clark, The Press the Founders Knew, in FREEING THE PRESSES:
THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN ACTION, supra note 1, at 33, 40.
117. Timothy E. Cook, Freeing the Presses: An Introductory Essay, in FREEING THE
PRESSES: THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN ACTION, supra note 1, at 1, 12.
118. Freeman, supra note 115, at 29.
119. David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 446–47 (2002).
120. Id. at 447; David S. Allen, 34 FREE SPEECH Y.B. 49, 49 (1996).
121. Yellow Journalism: The “Fake News” of the 19th Century, PUB. DOMAIN REV.,
https://publicdomainreview.org/collections/yellow-journalism-the-fake-news-of-the-
19th-century/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) [https://perma.cc/M69C-BG3C].
122. Id.
123. Allen, supra note 120, at 50.
124. Id.
125. Ralph Izard, Introduction, in FREEING THE PRESSES: THE FIRST AMENDMENT
IN ACTION, supra note 1, at 109.
126. GAJDA, supra note 49, at 32.
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“press” existed.127 However, the “new media” of the late 1980s began
to transform the media landscape.128 In the nascent stages of the In-
ternet, new platforms like personal delivery assistants and email
changed the way people interacted with news.129 In particular, the new
media distinguished itself from traditional outlets “by the promise of
offering greater openness and accessibility to those outside the politi-
cal and media establishments,” as well as by its tendency to defiantly
“shun textbook journalistic norms in favor of entertainment val-
ues.”130 By the early 2000s, blogging and social media sites began to
explode in popularity.131 As more people engaged with these newer,
more dynamic platforms, advertising revenue for traditional platforms
started to decrease.132 As a result, traditional media witnessed a na-
tional decline in the number of newspapers, television newsrooms,
and job positions for professional journalists.133
Meanwhile, online news outlets and social media provided new op-
portunities for “citizen journalists,”134 like bloggers, video-bloggers,
and podcasters. This interactive system of personal and digital net-
works blurred the lines between what, and who, constituted the “me-
dia.” Access to a computer or mobile phone could essentially
transform anyone into a reporter.135 As W. Lance Bennett suggests,
the current digital age is ironically “reminiscent of when printers pub-
lished citizen broadsides at the time of the American Revolution—but
on a far larger scale.”136 Today’s blogger is the twenty-first century
equivalent of a revolutionary-period “lonely pamphleteer.”137
B. The Era of Fake News and Civil “Discord”
“Fake news,” broadly defined, is the dissemination of inaccurate in-
formation, which predates both the Internet and social media.138
However, the term itself did not enter the general vernacular until
2016. The fake news phenomenon originated in a small, Macedonian
127. See Diana Owen, “New Media” and Contemporary Interpretations of Freedom
of the Press, in FREEING THE PRESSES: THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN ACTION, supra




131. Irfan Ahmad, The History of Social Media, SOCIAL MEDIA TODAY (Apr. 27,
2018), https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/the-history-of-social-media-infograph
ic-1/522285/ [https://perma.cc/97BZ-X5VA].
132. Napoli, supra note 25, at 69 n.74.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. W. Lance Bennet, The Twilight of Mass Media News, in FREEING THE
PRESSES: THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN ACTION, supra note 1, at 111, 112.
136. Id.
137. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972); see also GAJDA, supra note 49,
at 91.
138. Napoli, supra note 25, at 70.
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town.139 A group of people in that town registered at least 140 web-
sites to publish stories that were completely fabricated.140 The pur-
pose behind employing such sensationalist strategies was to entice as
many people as possible to click on the stories on social media, thus
maximizing advertising revenue.141 It was this get-rich-quick social
media scheme that birthed the phrase “fake news.”142
Though not the sole cause of fake news, social media’s ability to
allow instantaneous dissemination and sharing of information en-
hances the reach of false information.143 In fact, the authors of a re-
cent MIT study found that a “false story reaches 1,500 people six
times quicker” than a true story.144 But blaming digital social media
for displacing traditional gatekeepers paints an incomplete picture.145
Societal shifts may be equally, if not more, responsible.146 Indeed, the
MIT fake news study also confirmed that although bots147 shared
truthful stories and fabricated stories at the same rate, fake news
spreads faster because humans were more likely to spread it.148 This
suggests a human inclination to engage with sensationalist stories or
headlines and a corollary inability to distinguish between accurate and
inaccurate information.149
Compounding the technological repercussions of fake news is the
overlay of partisan politics. In January 2017, then-President-elect
Trump used the term to refer to CNN reporter Jim Acosta and later
exhibited a pattern of denouncing the “fake news media.”150 Rather
than referring to wholly false information, however, President Trump
politically commandeered the term to refer to any unfavorable cover-




143. See Napoli, supra note 25, at 69–70.
144. Robinson Meyer, The Grim Conclusions of the Largest-Ever Study of Fake
News, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2018/03/largest-study-ever-fake-news-mit-twitter/555104/ [https://perma.cc/X6FW-
C4SG].
145. Verstraete & Bambauer, supra note 24, at 132.
146. Id.
147. An internet “bot” is software designed to perform an automated task over the
Internet. Internet Bot, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/24063/in-
ternet-bot (last visited Oct. 2, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9NXZ-AMQ6]. The term “bot”
can also refer to automated social media accounts which disseminate “low-credibility
articles” that later go “viral.” Maria Temming, How Twitter Bots Get People to Spread
Fake News, SCI. NEWS (Nov. 20, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.sciencenews.org/arti-
cle/twitter-bots-fake-news-2016-election [https://perma.cc/Q5TB-JBA9].
148. Meyer, supra note 144 (emphasis added).
149. Much like the period of Yellow Journalism, fake news uses the human bias
toward the sensationalist and fabricated as a business strategy. See Alexandra Samuel,
To Fix Fake News, Look to Yellow Journalism, JSTOR DAILY (Nov. 29, 2016), https://
daily.jstor.org/to-fix-fake-news-look-to-yellow-journalism/ [https://perma.cc/2RDY-
6U3A].
150. Wendling, supra note 18.
2020] FEDERAL SHIELD LAW 435
age.151 Notably, most unfavorable coverage of President Trump came
from traditional network news organizations.152 And although net-
work news outlets are not necessarily the parties culpable for dissemi-
nating fake news,153 some media theorists suggest that the continual
use of the term has transformed the traditional media into the public
scapegoat.154 A 2018 Monmouth University poll tends to confirm this
hypothesis, reporting that 77% of Americans think that mainstream
media organizations and newspaper outlets report fake news.155
Besides fostering general confusion and distrust, fake news also
poses its own national security concerns. Those who study fake news
recognize that one type of fake news spreads falsehoods with the spe-
cific intent to undermine national security.156 This can take the shape
of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns.157 In 2016, disinforma-
tion campaigns were allegedly propagated by Russia with the intent to
“manipulate the democratic process” in the 2016 U.S. Presidential
Election.158
Thus, from genuine concerns about inaccuracy and influence in so-
cial media to the politicization of the term “fake news,” the institu-
tionalized press is struggling to assert its role as a government
watchdog in an era of growing media distrust.159 This media distrust
also often accompanies periods when national security concerns are at
a peak.
151. Id.; Michael C. Dorf & Sidney G. Tarrow, Stings and Scams: Fake News, the
First Amendment, and the New Activist Journalism, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 3 (2017).
152. Byron York, Harvard Study: CNN, NBC Trump Coverage 93 Percent Negative,
WASH. EXAMINER (May 19, 2017, 3:21 PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/
byron-york-harvard-study-cnn-nbc-trump-coverage-93-percent-negative [https://per
ma.cc/QE82-JHG8].
153. Cf. Napoli, supra note 25, at 73.
154. Wendling, supra note 18 (noting that political and media obsession with “fake
news” is actually hurting the credibility of otherwise credible news outlets).
155. Cristiano Lima, Poll: 77 Percent Say Major News Outlets Report ‘Fake News’,
POLITICO (Apr. 2, 2018, 10:50 AM EDT), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/02/
poll-fake-news-494421 [https://perma.cc/S8QU-GYQV].
156. VASU ET AL., supra note 23, at 5.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 9.
159. The checking function on the government has historically been regarded as the
primary function of a free press. See Werhan, supra note 14, at 1569 (“The press is
constitutionally protected so that it can execute these informing functions. First
Amendment doctrine therefore should be judged by its effectiveness in enabling the
press to gather and to publish the news that a democracy needs in order to flourish.”);
see also Blasi, supra note 31, at 527 (“Indeed, if one had to identify the single value
that was uppermost in the minds of the persons who drafted and ratified the First
Amendment, this checking value would be the most likely candidate.”).
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IV. WAR AND PRESS: NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
A. Modern Historical Tension Between National Security
and Press Freedom
The relationship between press freedom and national security has
always been a delicate balancing act. The United States has a history
of curtailing press freedom during times of extreme societal stress.160
This Section discusses the relationship between press freedom and na-
tional security from the 1970s through present day.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court settled most of its
doctrinal base for freedom of speech and freedom of the press
alike.161 The Court based its freedom of the press rulings on the free-
dom of publication, accepting the Constitutional role of the press as
the facilitator of information and opinion necessary for democratic cit-
izens to monitor their government.162 However, despite judicial recog-
nition of the “government watchdog” function of the press, the law
was much less settled when the press asserted the right to publish na-
tional security information.163
The Court decided many critical cases defining the scope of press
freedom against a backdrop of political turmoil, including the Viet-
nam War and the “imperial presidency” of President Richard
Nixon.164 Generally, the press was given an unusual amount of free-
dom in its Vietnam War coverage, and government censorship of the
war was “virtually nonexistent.”165 But negative press coverage of the
war generated controversy. Some historians maintain that the press
effectively “lost” the war in Vietnam by rousing the public’s anti-war
sentiment.166 The result was weeks of anti-war demonstrations, as
thousands of protestors shook the nation with the “quasi-revolution-
ary throbbings of a counterculture.”167
Although the press was given unusually liberal access in Vietnam,168
it began to lose favor with the government in the early 1970s. Specifi-
cally, in 1971, the Nixon Administration sued The New York Times for
publishing leaked material about the Vietnam War, known as the Pen-
tagon Papers.169 President Nixon brought suit to enjoin the newspa-
160. Werhan, supra note 14, at 1564.
161. Id. at 1570.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1570–71.
164. JEFFERY A. SMITH, WAR & PRESS FREEDOM 185 (1999).
165. Paul G. Cassell, Restrictions on Press Coverage of Military Operations: The
Right of Access, Grenada, and “Off-the-Record Wars”, 73 GEO. L.J. 931, 942 (1985).
166. Id. at 941.
167. SMITH, supra note 164, at 185.
168. Brian William DelVecchio, Press Access to American Military Operations and
the First Amendment: The Constitutionality of Imposing Restrictions, 31 TULSA L.J.
227, 232 (1995) (“In terms of complete and open access given to the press, no other
war can match that of the conflict in Vietnam.”).
169. SMITH, supra note 164, at 187.
2020] FEDERAL SHIELD LAW 437
pers from publishing the leaked analysis in New York Times Co. v.
United States (The Pentagon Papers Case),170 which would come to be
known as the seminal case analyzing prior restraints and national
security.171
The government argued that the First Amendment did not prevent
the President from enjoining publication of information posing “a se-
rious risk of immediate and irreparable harm” to national security.172
But in a short per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court ruled in favor
of the press.173 The Court held that the government’s attempt at a
prior restraint “[bore] a heavy presumption against its Constitutional
validity,” ultimately finding that the government had not met its bur-
den to justify imposition of a prior restraint on the press.174 Justice
Potter Stewart’s concurrence announced what is widely regarded to be
the constitutional standard for justifying prior restraints on national
security grounds:175 the government must prove that publication of a
state secret “will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable
damage” to the country.176
Thus, the Pentagon Papers Case stands for the proposition that
there is a strong presumption against constitutional validity of prior
restraints on the press, absent clearly articulable national security con-
cerns.177 This qualification for national security concerns discussed in
several of the concurring opinions highlights the fact that decisions
favoring the press, like the Pentagon Papers Case, were comparatively
rare during this time period.178 More decisions landed on the side of
preserving national security and abridging press freedoms.179 Indeed,
the Court decided Branzburg, discussed supra, only a year after the
Pentagon Papers Case but exhibited unwillingness to recognize corol-
lary rights of the press beyond the core right to publish.180
170. Id. at 186. The Pentagon Papers contained an extensive post-1945 analysis of
U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The highly classified study demonstrated that the U.S.
government had been deceiving the American people about the extent of U.S. in-
volvement for more than three decades. Jordan Moran, Nixon and the Pentagon Pa-
pers, UVA MILLER CTR., https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/educational-resour
ces/first-domino-nixon-and-the-pentagon-papers (last visited Sept. 25, 2019) [https://
perma.cc/TJ6B-AQP7].
171. DERIGAN SILVER, NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE COURTS 58 (2010).
172. SMITH, supra note 164, at 186.
173. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
174. Id.
175. Werhan, supra note 14, at 1573.
176. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J. concurring).
177. Id. at 714 (per curiam).
178. SMITH, supra note 164, at 65; see, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507,
507–10 (1980) (per curiam) (upholding a constructive trust mandating the transfer of
a former CIA agent’s earnings from his book detailing activities in Vietnam).
179. SMITH, supra note 164, at 65.
180. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684, 690 (1972). Interestingly, the Court
also issued the Branzburg decision just twelve days after the break-in at Watergate—
the event which ultimately would lead to Nixon’s resignation from Presidential office.
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The conflict between national security and press freedom was also
evident in the press–military relations following the Vietnam War. As
a result of the unfavorable press coverage in Vietnam, the military
“became increasingly restrictive of journalistic access.”181 During the
1983 invasion of Granada, for example, the Pentagon did not allow
American correspondents to be part of the invasion force at all, citing
national security reasons.182
Despite attempts by the media and the military to negotiate guide-
lines for managing military–media relations,183 the trend of restricting
press access continued during the Gulf War.184 As President George
H.W. Bush initiated war to drive Iraqi invaders out of Kuwait, the
executive branch issued a list of “ground rules” for press coverage.185
Coverage was limited to pool reporting and subject to a security re-
view prior to release.186 In addition, pool reporters were ordinarily
“allowed to talk to soldiers only in the presence of a military public
affairs officer.”187 If a reporter disputed the outcome of the security
review, such disputes “were to be resolved by the military’s Joint In-
formation Bureau in Saudi Arabia” and appealed to the Pentagon’s
public affair’s office.188 The military detained “[a]t least two dozen
reporters and photographers” for attempting to cover the Gulf War
outside of the designated press pool, and some journalists temporarily
lost their press credentials as a result.189 Pool reporting and security
review “made the Persian Gulf regulations the most strict in the his-
tory of press coverage of U.S. military operations.”190
Leading into the Iraq War, the military chose a middle path be-
tween the free reign of journalists in Vietnam and the pre-censorship
system of the Gulf War.191 The “embedded press” system allowed
journalists access to the frontlines by embedding them within a mili-
tary unit.192 Reporters could talk to soldiers, ride along in Humvees
and helicopters, and report insight that only came with such close ac-
cess.193 However, scholars have noted the subtly subversive nature of
181. Elana J. Zeide, Note, In Bed with the Military: First Amendment Implications
of Embedded Journalism, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1312–13 (2005).
182. Cassell, supra note 165, at 943.
183. DelVecchio, supra note 168, at 233–34.
184. SMITH, supra note 164, at 188; Joshua R. Keefe, The American Military and the
Press: From Vietnam to Iraq, INQUIRIES J., http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/
10/the-american-military-and-the-press-from-vietnam-to-iraq (last visited Dec. 20,
2019) [https://perma.cc/2UYG-7RR8].
185. SMITH, supra note 164, at 192.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 46.
188. Id. at 192.
189. Id. at 194.
190. DelVecchio, supra note 168, at 236.
191. Keefe, supra note 184.
192. Id.
193. See id.; see also David Ignatius, The Dangers of Embedded Journalism, in War
and Politics, WASH. POST (May 2, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con-
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the embedded press system,194 effectively granting reporters access in
exchange for them “tell[ing] the story the military wanted told.”195
Due to the social cohesion between reporters and soldiers, the embed-
ded press system fostered a “military bubble.”196 Journalists gained
access to valuable information but also “inherit[ed] the distortions and
biases that [came] with being ‘on the bus.’”197
Besides the potential for one-sided reporting, the embedded press
system was not without its own censorship restrictions. For example,
in 1996, reporters were told if they were embedded with U.S. troops in
Bosnia for more than twenty-four hours, then they needed specific
permission to quote the soldiers.198 Reporters were to consider every-
thing they heard and saw as being “on background.”199 Additionally,
the later years of the Iraq War saw a growing number of reports of
U.S. troops harassing journalists, confiscating tapes, and detaining
reporters.200
From the government’s attempt to censor publication in the Penta-
gon Papers Case201 to restricting press access of military operations,202
the government has struggled to balance the inevitable conflict be-
tween the press and national security during wartime abroad.
B. National Security and Terrorism
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 brought the national
security concerns that influenced policy abroad to home soil. Militants
from the al-Qaeda terrorist group carried out the largest terrorist at-
tack on U.S. soil by crashing two planes into the Twin Towers at the
World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon, and
one in a field in western Pennsylvania.203 Nearly 3,000 people died in
the 9/11 attacks.204
As an immediate national security response, the federal govern-
ment engaged in various actions compromising individual liberties:
jailing more than 750 aliens on immigration charges and holding them
in restrictive conditions without bond, allegedly torturing terrorist sus-
pects at Guantanamo Bay, and using heightened communications sur-
tent/article/2010/04/30/AR2010043001100.html?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/N6U
A-UPR5].
194. Keefe, supra note 184.
195. Id.
196. Ignatius, supra note 193.
197. Id.
198. SMITH, supra note 164, at 47.
199. Id.
200. Keefe, supra note 184.
201. SMITH, supra note 164, at 186.
202. See generally DelVecchio, supra note 168.
203. 9/11 Attacks, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/9-11-at-
tacks (last updated Sept. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/Q4Z9- EPJM].
204. Id.
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veillance systems to monitor phone and internet communications.205
The government classified these events and others as national security
information.206 Some historians indicate that the “national security”
justification was used loosely in the post-9/11 period.207 Both the Bush
and Obama administrations asserted a “state secrets” privilege to pre-
vent courts from reviewing claims of wiretapping and torture.208
However, the federal government’s responses to the “War on Ter-
ror” would not have come to light without the press reporting on clas-
sified information from government leakers.209 In response to these
leaks, the government announced it would investigate its employees
and discover the leakers.210 In so doing, federal officials “probed the
weaknesses of free press doctrine for openings that . . . permit[ted]
restrictions on the press’s freedom to obtain and to publish such state
secrets.”211 Prior to 9/11, Branzburg’s potential adverse effect of al-
lowing federal prosecutors to subpoena journalists for sources showed
little sign of materializing because of prosecutorial restraint.212 But as
Keith Werhan suggests, federal prosecutorial restraint “may be erod-
ing.”213 This is exhibited by the post-9/11 push for investigating jour-
nalists’ newsgathering activities and the increased number of
journalists jailed for refusing to name confidential sources.214 The
steady flow of federal subpoenas has continued since the drive for a
federal shield law in 2007.215
The 9/11 attacks left a profound and long-lasting impact on the na-
tional psyche. For almost two decades and over the span of three pres-
idential administrations, Americans have consistently stated that
“defending the nation against terrorism should be a top policy priority
for the White House and Congress.”216 Heightened national security
concerns combined with the changes in the media landscape raise
questions about who constitutes a “journalist.”217 Both have contrib-
uted to judicial reluctance to reconsider a First Amendment reporter’s
205. Werhan, supra note 14, at 1568 (detailing risks to individual freedoms post-9/
11).
206. Id.
207. FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ JR., DEMOCRACY IN THE DARK: THE SEDUCTION
OF GOVERNMENT SECRECY 124–25. (2015).
208. See id.
209. Werhan, supra note 14, at 1568.
210. Id. at 1584.
211. Id. at 1568.
212. Id. at 1598.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1592.
215. Lee Levine Subcommittee Hearing Statement, supra note 5, at 10–11.
216. John Gramlich, Defending Against Terrorism Has Remained a Top Policy Pri-
ority for Americans Since 9/11, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 11, 2018), http://www.pewre
search.org/fact-tank/2018/09/11/defending-against-terrorism-has-remained-a-top-poli
cy-priority-for-americans-since-9-11/ [https://perma.cc/X48B-8RTG].
217. See Werhan, supra note 14, at 1600 (discussing the purported difficulties in
defining the press).
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privilege.218 The proposed Free Flow of Information Act of 2017 at-
tempted to address the definition of “journalist,” persisting national
security concerns, and the need to secure a free press.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION ACT OF 2017
Congress has introduced a federal shield law in nearly every session
since 2005. Each of the proposals was substantively similar, with most
differences demonstrating Congress’s struggle to define “journalist”
or “covered person.”219 None of them passed. And despite renewed
calls to enshrine a federal qualified privilege into the law,220 the Free
Flow of Information Act of 2017 died in committee at the adjourn-
ment of the 115th Congress. This Section will analyze the major provi-
sions of the most recently proposed shield law with a focus on national
security and media perspectives.
A. Defining “Journalist”
The Court in Branzburg declined to recognize a reporter’s privilege
in part due to the constitutional questions that would arise if the judi-
ciary defined “reporter” or “journalist.”221 Though Congress, too, has
struggled with articulating an acceptable definition,222 scholars note
that defining “journalist” through legislative line-drawing is a far more
manageable method.223 In fact, Congress often draws distinctions be-
tween different speakers and publishers, and such differentiation “is
constitutional, as long as . . . the differentiation is reasonable.”224
218. See id. at 1567 (acknowledging “Court’s failure to accept an auxiliary right of
the press to gather the news” in the post-9/11 environment).
219. See Lauren J. Russell, Note, Shielding the Media: In an Age of Bloggers,
Tweeters, and Leakers, Will Congress Succeed in Defining the Term “Journalist” and
in Passing a Long-Sought Federal Shield Act?, 93 OR. L. REV. 193, 209–19 (2014).
220. See generally Lee Levine Subcommittee Hearing Statement, supra note 5, at
10–11.
221. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972) (“Sooner or later, it would be
necessary to define those categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege, a
questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is
the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as
much as of the large metropolitan paper who utilizes the latest photocomposition
methods.”).
222. GAJDA, supra note 49, at 152.
223. Stone, supra note 8, at 47–48. Interestingly, states that have enacted shield
laws have “all defined, through statutory language, who may claim protection behind
the shield.” Anthony L. Fargo, Analyzing Federal Shield Law Proposals: What Con-
gress Can Learn from the States, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 35, 56 (2006). Furthermore,
the question of who is covered by the shield law has generated little controversy in
state court litigation. Id. at 58.
224. Stone, supra note 8, at 47–48 (“Whereas the Court is wisely reluctant to define
“the press” for purposes of the First Amendment, it will grant Congress considerable
deference in deciding who, as a matter of sound public policy, should be covered by
the journalist-source privilege.”).
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Section 4 of the Free Flow of Information Act defines the “covered
persons” who may claim the protection from compelled disclosure
broadly.225 The term “covered person” is defined as:
[A] person who regularly gathers, prepares, collects, photographs,
records, writes, edits, reports, or publishes news or information that
concerns local, national, or international events or other matters of
public interest for dissemination to the public . . . for a substantial
financial gain and includes a supervisor, employer, parent, subsidi-
ary, or affiliate of such covered person.226
Despite the broad array of newsgathering activities included, the
proposed bill requires that an individual generate a “substantial finan-
cial gain” from newsgathering activities to be considered a “covered
person.”227
Thus, while this definition covers paid freelancers of all types for
news entities, it is less certain whether the bill would include student-
journalists. The status of “bloggers” and “citizen journalists” is also
unclear. According to the proposed bill, a blogger would have to
prove derivation of “substantial financial gain” from blogging activi-
ties. But what constitutes “substantial financial gain”? Bloggers could
potentially argue that revenue derived from advertising on their blog
or website is a source of financial gain.228 Due to the uncertainty sur-
rounding “substantial financial gain,” courts would likely revisit the
debate about who constitutes a “covered person” in interpreting the
shield law.229
225. Free Flow of Information Act of 2017, H.R. 4382, 115th Cong. § 4(2) (2017).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. For reference, bloggers’ salaries vary widely. Surveys have shown most blog-
gers do not make enough to support their lifestyles from blogging, but a small per-
centage of them can spend less than two hours a day blogging and earn $150,000 a
year. See Melanie Pinola, Can I Really Make a Living By Blogging?, LIFEHACKER
(Mar. 6, 2014, 1:00 PM), https://lifehacker.com/can-i-really-make-a-living-by-blogging-
1537783554 [https://perma.cc/9EQL-4ZX8]. Similarly, being a social media “influ-
encer” can also be very lucrative. Influencers with social media followings of up to 1
million can command up to $10,000 for a single social media post. Chavie Lieber,
How and Why Do Influencers Make So Much Money? The Head of An Influencer
Agency Explains, VOX (Nov. 28, 2018, 6:00 PM EST), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/
2018/11/28/18116875/influencer-marketing-social-media-engagement-instagram-you-
tube [https://perma.cc/7YBG-8GB8].
229. Paul Fletcher, Sessions’ Testimony Prompts New Federal Shield Law Bill Pro-
tecting Journalists, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2017 8:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
paulfletcher/2017/11/29/sessions-testimony-prompts-new-federal-shield-law-bill-pro
tecting-journalists/#354c1a4a4912 [https://perma.cc/X8FC-HBEJ]. It should be noted
that the states with shield laws have all been able to articulate an acceptable defi-
nition of “journalist.” See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11(c) (2017) (defining
“journalist” as “any person, company, or entity, or the employees, independent con-
tractors, or agents of that person, company, or entity, engaged in the business of gath-
ering, compiling, writing, editing, photographing, recording, or processing information
for dissemination via any news medium.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.510–.520 (2017) (pro-
tecting persons “connected with, employed by or engaged in any medium of commu-
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Despite this interpretative question, the proposed definition of jour-
nalist was a positive one for the media overall. By adopting a broad
definition but limiting covered persons to professional newsgatherers
engaged in the process of doing their job,230 the bill recognized the
role of the press in disseminating information to society—the very
reason motivating a journalist’s privilege. Allowing anyone who con-
tributes to dissemination of news to qualify as a “covered person”
would “fail[ ] to recognize . . . the important contributions that stat-
utes like reporter’s shield laws help provide . . . .”231 Indeed, if some
newsgathering—including the promise of secrecy to sources—is to be
protected, then it is not only important but necessary “to define who
the protected newsgatherers are.”232 The limitation also makes sense
from a practical standpoint, as professional journalists “usually have
access to government or other insiders” that “citizen journalists” do
not.233
B. A Qualified Privilege: National Security Exceptions
The proposed privilege was not absolute. A federal entity could still
compel a “covered person” to appear in court or provide information
if the entity seeking disclosure could be able to satisfy the statutory
test.234 This includes ultimately proving that the public interest in new-
sgathering outweighs the public interest in disclosure.235
To compel disclosure, first the government would need to prove
that it has “exhausted all reasonable alternative sources” to find the
testimony or document sought before subpoenaing the journalist.236
Arguably, this would not impose a great burden on the government
because the requirement was taken “almost verbatim” from the De-
partment of Justice (“DOJ”) Guidelines.237 The DOJ Guidelines on
obtaining information and records from members of the news media
advise prosecutors to seek information from news media only “after
all reasonable alternative attempts have been made to obtain the in-
formation from alternative sources . . . .”238 If a shield law modeled on
these guidelines ever passes, failure to comply with these recommen-
dations would be subject to judicial review instead of left to the DOJ’s
nication to the public,” which includes “any newspaper, magazine or other periodical,
book, pamphlet, news service, wire service, news or feature syndicate, broadcast sta-
tion or network, or cable television system.”).
230. Lee Levine Subcommittee Hearing Statement, supra note 5.
231. GAJDA, supra note 49, at 213.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Free Flow of Information Act of 2017, H.R. 4382, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017).
235. See id. § 2(a)(4).
236. Id. § 2(a)(1).
237. Lee Levine Subcommittee Hearing Statement, supra note 5.
238. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(a)(3) (2018).
444 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
discretion.239 In effect, a Free Flow of Information Act would trans-
form the DOJ guidelines into mandatory rules for compelled
disclosure.
Second, the government generally must prove a degree of necessity,
which varies with the governmental objective.240 The degree of neces-
sity required in the Free Flow of Information Act of 2017 was also
heavily influenced by the DOJ Guidelines.241 For criminal investiga-
tions and prosecutions, the government must prove that there are
“reasonable grounds to believe a crime has occurred” based on infor-
mation obtained from a person other than the journalist.242 Addition-
ally, the government must prove that the “testimony or document
sought is critical” to the criminal investigation, prosecution, or de-
fense.243 For all other non-criminal matters, to satisfy the second
prong, the government must prove that the “testimony or document
sought is critical to the successful completion of the matter,” again
based on information obtained from someone other than the
journalist.244
The most recently proposed federal shield law specifically enumer-
ated exceptions for which compelling testimony or a document is per-
mitted, even if such information “could reveal the identity of a source
. . . .”245 The exceptions generally allowed disclosure of source identity
in cases implicating national security or the illegal disclosure of
information.246
The first exception allowed disclosing a source’s identity if such dis-
closure was necessary to “prevent, or identify any perpetrator of, an
act of terrorism against the United States . . . or other significant and
specified harm to national security with the objective to prevent such
harm.”247 Relatedly, disclosure of a source could be required if the
identity of the source was “necessary to prevent imminent death or
significant bodily harm.”248 Therefore, a journalist may be required to
identify a source if necessary to either prevent a terror attack or to
identify the perpetrator of an attack for prevention purposes.249
239. Lee Levine Subcommittee Hearing Statement, supra note 5, at 40.
240. See H.R. 4382 § 2(a).
241. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(a)(5)(ii) (recommending virtually identical standards for
investigations of criminal and civil matters); see also 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(g)(1)(i) (au-
thorizing use of DOJ subpoena to prevent or mitigate acts of terrorism or substantial
bodily harm).
242. H.R. 4382 § 2(a)(2)(A).
243. Id.
244. Id. § 2(a)(2)(B).
245. Id. § 2(a)(3).
246. Id.
247. Id. § 2(a)(3)(A).
248. Id. § 2(a)(3)(B).
249. Id. § 2(a)(3)(A).
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With the public continually citing national security as a top govern-
mental priority,250 it is unsurprising that a national security exception
has been in nearly every shield law proposed since 2005.251 In fact,
failure to include such national security exceptions triggered opposi-
tion to earlier versions of the bill in 2005 and prompted such an excep-
tion in the Senate’s revised draft.252 The 2017 bill also reflected
concerns that earlier national security exceptions were too narrow,
thus making it too difficult for the government to compel any informa-
tion.253 Interestingly, however, the bill does not provide a definition
for national security.254
The second exception specifically addressed the issue of “leakers.”
The provision allowed for disclosure of a source’s identity if it was
“necessary to identify a person who has disclosed” certain informa-
tion, such as trade secrets, “individually identifiable health informa-
tion,” and “nonpublic personal information” protected by federal
consumer protection laws.255 Importantly, the act would have also cre-
ated an exception to identify leakers of “properly classified informa-
tion” that “has caused or will cause significant and articulable harm to
the national security.”256
These provisions appear to restrict the government by requiring a
“significant and articulable harm” to national security in order to
compel a leaker’s identity.257 However, such provisions could stir con-
troversy among journalists regarding what constitutes an “articulable
harm to national security.”258 History demonstrates that the executive
branch has used the term “national security” quite loosely.259 For ex-
ample, the “national security” label has been used to “justify secret
reports on telephone calls made by people like Eleanor Roosevelt,
journalists, the chair of the House Agriculture Committee, White
House aides, and Supreme Court Justices William Douglas and Potter
250. Gramlich, supra note 216.
251. See Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong.
§ 3(a)(2)(A) & (b) (2007); Free Flow of Information Act of 2009, S. 448, 111th Cong.
§ 5 (2009); Free Flow of Information Act of 2011, H.R. 2932, 112th Cong.
§ 2(a)(3)(A) & (b) (2011); Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, H.R. 1962, 113th
Cong. § 2(a)(3)(A) (2013).
252. See Reporter’s Privilege Legislation: Issues and Implications: Hearing Before
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5 (2005) (statement of Hon. Richard G.
Lugar, Senator from Indiana) [hereinafter 2005 Senate Hearing].
253. See id. at 29 (statements of Senator Feinstein and Geoffrey Stone, University
of Chicago Law Professor). The 2005 version of the bill only permitted the use of the
national security exceptions if necessary to prevent “imminent danger.” Free Flow of
Information Act of 2005, S. 1419, 109th Cong. § 2(a)(3)(A) (2005).
254. Free Flow of Information Act of 2017, H.R. 4382, 115th Cong. § 4 (2017).
255. H.R. 4382 § 2(a)(3)(C).
256. Id. § 2(a)(3)(D)(i)–(ii).
257. Id. § 2(a)(3)(D)(ii).
258. Id.
259. SCHWARZ JR., supra note 207, at 124–25.
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Stewart.”260 In the post-9/11 period, the label was used to “stop courts
from reviewing claims based on warrantless wiretapping and tor-
ture.”261 National security has even been used as a justification for the
Trump administration to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum im-
ports.262 Given the broad designation of national security, the govern-
ment would likely not have difficulty articulating a national security
interest. Thus, the government could likely compel the name of a gov-
ernment leaker even if the shield law were passed.
Finally, the proposed shield law provided a balancing test.263 In or-
der to compel disclosure, the government must prove “that the public
interest in compelling disclosure of the information or document in-
volved outweighs the public interest in gathering or disseminating
news or information.”264 The proposed bill also authorized the court
to “consider the extent of any harm to national security” as part of its
analysis.265
Therefore, national security weighed in favor of the government—
and thus in favor of compelled disclosure—in two of the three prongs
the government must meet. For example, the second prong allowed
disclosure of documents and source identity if “necessary to prevent,
or to identify any perpetrator of, an act of terrorism” or, more
broadly, to prevent harm to national security.266 The third prong also
allowed consideration of national security in the court’s balancing
analysis of the public interest in disclosure versus the public interest in
newsgathering.267 In cases implicating national security, the govern-
ment’s burden would be to articulate the national security interest and
prove “by a preponderance of the evidence” that they have “ex-
hausted all reasonable alternative sources” before turning to a jour-
nalist for the information.268
VI. EFFECT OF A FEDERAL SHIELD LAW: MEDIA AND
NATIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVES
Despite its failure to pass, the Free Flow of Information Act of 2017
provides a useful framework for a qualified shield law balancing free
press concerns with national security interests. Although modeled
260. Id. at 124.
261. Id. at 124–25.
262. Glenn Thrush, Trump’s Use of National Security to Impose Tariffs Faces Court
Test, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/politics/
trump-national-security-tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/CLR4-739T].
263. The balancing test borrows from the test advocated by District of Columbia
Court of Appeals Judge David Tatel. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller,
397 F.3d 964, 986–1004 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., concurring).
264. Free Flow of Information Act of 2017, H.R. 4382, 115th Cong. § 2(a)(4)
(2017).
265. Id. § 2(b).
266. Id. § 2(a)(3)(A).
267. Id. § 2(a)(4).
268. Id. § 2(a).
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heavily on the DOJ Guidelines,269 enshrining guidelines into law
would ensure consistent application instead of adherence that fluctu-
ates with each administration. For example, former Attorney General
Jeff Sessions vowed to revise the guidelines and publicly refused to
make a “blanket statement” to not jail journalists.270 A statutory
shield law would mitigate the discretionary impulses of federal prose-
cutors by requiring them to adhere to an enforceable framework271
that is more difficult to change. It would also provide a standard
framework for courts tasked with reviewing reporter privilege cases.
A. Persisting Problems
Despite the probable benefits of enacting a shield law in general,
the most recently proposed shield law contained some of the same
ambiguities of previous bills. First, it failed to provide definitions for
“properly classified” or for “national security.”272 This problem is
twofold. First, as evidenced by the Pentagon Papers Case and others,
the government has a consistent pattern of overclassifying informa-
tion.273 Second, the Pentagon Papers Case also categorized the infor-
mation as a threat to national security, which, too, was inaccurate.274
Without definitions of what constitutes “properly classified informa-
tion” or what circumstances give rise to a national security concern,
the government will likely continue its pattern of over-classifying in-
formation and using “national security” loosely.275
Even if the Free Flow of Information Act of 2017 had passed, the
effectiveness of the shield for journalists is questionable. The broad
exceptions would likely not prevent the perceived chilling effect on
journalists.276 The numerous and wide-ranging exceptions make any
journalist’s promise of confidentiality come with a hefty disclaimer.
Essentially, the journalist can only promise confidentiality to the ex-
269. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(a)(3) (2018).
270. Mallory Shelbourne, Sessions Declines ‘Blanket’ Assurance to Not Jail Journal-
ists, THE HILL (Oct. 18, 2017, 3:06 PM EDT), https://thehill.com/homenews/adminis
tration/356070-sessions-declines-blanket-assurance-to-not-jail-journalists [https://per
ma.cc/4NQA-AKTR].
271. See Lee Levine Subcommittee Hearing Statement, supra note 5, at 11–12 (ac-
knowledging most courts have held that the DOJ guidelines are not judicially
enforceable).
272. H.R. 4382 § 4. The DOJ Guidelines also fail to provide definitions. See 28
C.F.R. § 50.10(a)(3).
273. Werhan, supra note 14, at 1597 n.221.
274. Lee Levine Subcommittee Hearing Statement, supra note 5, at 6 n.17 (noting
that the Solicitor General who tried the Pentagon Papers Case for the government
later wrote that he perceived no threat to national security from publication).
275. See 2005 Senate Hearing, supra note 252, at 36 (statements of Senator Schu-
mer) (“[W]hen [the law] just says national security, the Government for its own pur-
poses can brand it national security when it should not be.”).
276. Stone, supra note 8, at 52 (noting the “misguided” nature of qualified privi-
lege, which does not account for the disclosures it prevents from occurring due to
uncertainty of the privilege).
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tent that the source’s information does not implicate one of the shield
law’s exceptions or impact national security. Such a promise may
prove especially hollow in the context of government leakers. If leak-
ing classified government information constitutes a national security
concern, or if the court determines that national security concerns out-
weigh the public interest in disclosure, journalists reporting on gov-
ernment wrongdoing may be forced to name their confidential
sources. Accordingly, if “national security” is allowed to envelop gov-
ernment leaks of any nature, any shield law would hardly allow the
media to act as a government watchdog.277
Applying the 2017 bill to the facts of Branzburg is also instructive in
determining the strength of the journalist’s shield. Although shield
laws generally allow reporters significant leeway in reporting on local
matters of public concern, that leeway is restricted if those matters
implicate federal crimes.278 For example, in Branzburg, petitioner
Branzburg witnessed a crime,279 whereas petitioners Pappas and Cald-
well did not.280 Thus, the 2017 bill would not have shielded Branzburg
because it does not prohibit a federal entity from compelling informa-
tion obtained from witnessing criminal conduct.281
By contrast, Caldwell and Pappas did not witness crimes, so the
2017 bill would have shielded them. However, the government could
have potentially still compelled their information if it was critical to a
prosecution.282 To compel disclosure, the government would have to
prove reasonable grounds to believe the Black Panthers committed a
crime, Caldwell or Pappas had information “critical” to that prosecu-
tion, and it had exhausted all other reasonable alternative sources.283
Although there is no guarantee of the outcome for Caldwell or Pappas
under the 2017 bill, the heightened burden of proof may have de-
terred prosecutors from subpoenaing Caldwell or Pappas in the first
place.
B. Unintended Consequences
Attempts to pass a shield law may give rise to unanticipated conse-
quences. Just as the government probed the weaknesses of the free
press doctrine in the wake of 9/11 by subpoenaing journalists,284 the
government would likely continue to take advantage of any statutory
loopholes in a federal shield law.
277. See 2005 Senate Hearing, supra note 252, at 29 (statement of Geoffrey Stone,
University of Chicago Law Professor).
278. Free Flow of Information Act of 2017, H.R. 4382 115th Cong. § 2(a)(2)(A)
(2017).
279. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 668, 669 (1972).
280. POWE, JR., supra note 26, at 180.
281. H.R. 4382 § 2(e).
282. Id. § 2(a)(2)(A).
283. See id. § 2(a)(1)–(2)(A).
284. Werhan, supra note 14, at 1568.
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There is already evidence of the government bypassing the sub-
poena process altogether by simply seizing documents.285 For exam-
ple, the government indicted former Senate Intelligence staffer James
Wolfe for allegedly leaking confidential information to reporters and
lying to authorities.286 As part of the investigation, the FBI seized
years of email and phone records from New York Times reporter Ali
Watkins, with whom Wolfe previously had a three-year relation-
ship.287 The DOJ Guidelines state that, like the use of subpoenas, seiz-
ing communication records of the news media is an “extraordinary
measure.”288 The guidelines also provide that prosecutors should give
notice to the news media before seizing information.289 However, no-
tice is not required if the Attorney General determines that “such no-
tice would pose a clear and substantial threat to the integrity of the
investigation, risk grave harm to national security, or present an immi-
nent risk of death or serious bodily harm.”290 As noted above, these
guidelines are discretionary. If a federal shield law were enacted, the
government may turn to pursuing sources and information through
search warrants instead of subpoenas, thus circumventing a statutory
test for compelled disclosure.
C. Reaffirming Media Credibility in the “Fake News” Era
Press freedom and national security will likely always collide. But
the national security concern created by fake news merits expanding
press freedom. Sensationalist stories spread by bots and creators of
fake news threaten journalistic integrity.291 At its worst, both state-
sponsored disinformation campaigns and misinformation for the do-
mestic political agenda can severely threaten the democratic process
and pose harm to national security.292 As media experts note, fake
news is a multidimensional problem requiring a multifaceted ap-
proach of legislative, technological, and social solutions.293 One solu-
tion is the development and maintenance of credible fact-checking
sites to assess the truth of stories disseminated online.294 However,
fact-checking sites do not solve the problem alone because they fail to
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reach people who are not “predisposed to fact-checking” due to their
own “cognitive bias” or “digital illiteracy.”295 This suggests that more
truthful counter-speech, like news spread through traditional media
outlets, is also needed to combat false stories.296
The ability to spread truthful counter-speech is especially necessary
considering the following shocking juxtaposition in First Amendment
doctrine applied to fake news. Generally, the First Amendment pro-
tects “dissemination of opinions and purported statements of fact,”
even when false.297 In 2012, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Alvarez rejected the notion that false information fell outside of First
Amendment protection absent a showing of harm.298 In Alvarez, the
Court held that the Stolen Valor Act, which made it a crime to falsely
claim receipt of military decorations, violated the First Amend-
ment.299 The Court emphasized that even considering instances of def-
amation and fraud, “falsity alone” is not enough to exclude speech
from First Amendment protection.300 “The statement must be a know-
ing or reckless falsehood.”301 And although fake news is often pur-
posely misleading, proving it to be a reckless or knowing falsehood
may still be difficult. In the context of news, the defendant will “al-
ways claim . . . that some editorial judgment is necessary to turn notes
or raw footage into sellable news.”302 Therefore, the First Amendment
potentially provides a substantially robust protection for fake news.
By contrast, “efforts to uncover hidden information” of public in-
terest remain legally vulnerable.303 As discussed at length in this Com-
ment, there is currently no federal constitutional or statutory privilege
preventing journalists from forced disclosure of their sources. Promis-
ing confidentiality is often necessary to uncover and report on matters
of public concern.304 Moreover, contacting confidential sources is oc-
casionally necessary for understanding context and confirming accu-
racy of official news pronouncements.305 Much like the unilateral lens
of the embedded press system,306 the inability to confirm statements
of authorities with confidential sources would result in reporters
“spoon feeding the public the ‘official’ statements of public relations
officers.”307
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As a result of this surprising peculiarity in First Amendment doc-
trine, “[j]ournalism struggles, while fake news thrives.”308 A federal
shield law is needed to unearth the truth behind fake news, whether in
the form of domestic misinformation from official sources or state-
sponsored disinformation campaigns abroad. A secure press uninhib-
ited by the threat of subpoenas can bring a strong voice to counter
false information.
VII. CONCLUSION
Many scholars have noted the inherent tension between expanded
press freedom and national security. Some have commented that the
countervailing interests in a transparent, democratic society and the
legitimate need for government secrecy are sometimes difficult, and
perhaps even “impossible” to reconcile.309 The failure of every at-
tempt to pass a federal shield law underscores this idea.
Had the Free Flow of Information Act of 2017 passed, it would
have been a promising first step in providing journalists a long-sought
federal privilege to shield their sources. However, the numerous quali-
fications and exceptions likely would have done little to prevent a chil-
ling effect on the flow of information to the public. Future proposed
bills should include definitions for “properly classified information”
and “national security.” This would prevent the government from in-
voking “national security” generally before subpoenaing a journalist.
In addition, enacting a federal shield law would address the troub-
ling quirk in First Amendment law that protects fake news while leav-
ing attempts to uncover truthful information legally vulnerable. A
shield law providing statutory protection for those attempts to un-
cover information through confidential sources could combat the dis-
semination of fake news. In a post-9/11 America where fake news
creates national security concerns and threatens the integrity of the
journalistic profession, journalists need more than a paper shield.
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